竞争政策与职工工资——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验

竞争政策与职工工资——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验

Competition Policy and Employee Wages: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law

《财经研究》2023年49卷第5期 页码：140 - 153 online：2023年5月3日

作者

中：毕茜 , 李靖

英：Bi Qian, Li Jing

作者单位：西南大学 经济管理学院, 重庆 400715

摘要及关键词

摘要：规范收入分配问题以及构建公平竞争的市场秩序是党和政府关注的焦点。文章以《反垄断法》实施为契机，构建双重差分模型实证检验了《反垄断法》施行对职工工资的影响。研究发现，与低垄断程度企业相比，《反垄断法》实施显著降低了高垄断程度企业职工工资水平，且经过平行趋势、倾向匹配得分、改变样本期间等一系列稳健性检验后结论依然成立。考察影响机制发现，《反垄断法》通过降低高垄断程度企业的垄断利润率以及信息不对称程度来削弱职工工资。异质性检验发现，《反垄断法》对职工工资的抑制作用主要体现在市场竞争程度较弱行业的企业、行政干预程度较低地区的企业、国有企业以及税收规模较高的企业。文章的研究丰富了职工工资的影响因素研究，为《反垄断法》的施行效果评价提供了参考和借鉴，同时对于完善分配制度和规范收入分配秩序具有重要政策含义。

关键词：《反垄断法》；竞争政策；收入分配；职工工资；产权性质

Summary: The high income problem of China’s monopoly enterprises has been widely concerned by all sectors of society. The existing literature finds that the unreasonable high salary paid by monopoly enterprises is the main reason for the large income gap between employees of monopoly enterprises and non-monopoly enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to explore effective ways to solve the unreasonable high income problem of monopoly enterprises, so as to improve the distribution system and standardize the order of income distribution. Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2015, this paper takes the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law as the research opportunity to construct a DID model to empirically test its impact on employee wages. It is found that: Compared with enterprises with a low monopoly degree, the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law significantly reduces the wage level of employees in enterprises with a high monopoly degree, and the conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests. The influence mechanism analysis finds that the Anti-monopoly Law weakens employee wages by reducing the monopoly profit margin and information asymmetry of enterprises with a high monopoly degree. The heterogeneity test finds that the inhibitory effect of the Anti-monopoly Law on employee wages is mainly reflected in enterprises in industries with a weak degree of market competition, enterprises in regions with a low degree of administrative intervention, state-owned enterprises, and enterprises with a high tax scale. The marginal contributions of this paper are mainly as follows: (1) It examines the impact effect of the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law on the wage payment of monopoly enterprises and its specific role path, which enriches the research on the microeconomic consequences of the Anti-monopoly Law from the perspective of income distribution, and expands the research on the influencing factors of employee wages from the perspective of competition policy. (2) The existing literature mainly discusses the phenomenon that monopoly will lead to unreasonably high wage payments, lacking research on how to solve this phenomenon; while this paper takes the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law as the starting point and finds that it can effectively suppress the high wage payment of monopoly enterprises, making up for the shortcoming of the existing literature. (3) From the perspective of competition policy, it provides empirical evidence and theoretical support for the government to improve the distribution system, standardize the order of income distribution, and narrow the income gap. This paper finds that the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law can reduce the employee wages of monopoly enterprises, and then narrow the income gap between monopoly enterprises and non-monopoly enterprises. Therefore, government departments can make full use of the Anti-monopoly Law to regulate the unreasonably high income of monopoly enterprises, and then form a standardized and reasonable income distribution pattern.

Key words:Anti-monopoly Law; competition policy; income distribution; employee wages; nature of property

其他信息

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20230221.304

收稿日期：2022-08-11

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