国外权威期刊目录 American Economic Review · 《美国经济评论》（总第181期）
期刊介绍
American Economic Review 由美国经济学会主办，1911年创立，该刊目的文章题目范围广泛，是美国经济学界最古老、最受人尊敬的经济专业学术期刊之一。在经济学领域，被视为最具有学术声望的重要期刊之一，位列经济学五大刊之首，堪称经济学皇冠上的明珠。其文献代表着对经济学研究以及对经济现象最影响深远的认识，而这些文献的作者也大多是诺贝尔经济学奖得主。
本期期卷：Volume 112
发表日期：April 2022
来源：https://www.aeaweb.org/issues/673
或点击文末“阅读原文”
2022年4月刊合集（卷112）
目 录
（1）
Public Procurement in Law and Practice
法律与实践中的公共采购
Erica Bosio; Simeon Djankov; Edward Glaeser; Andrei Shleifer
（2）
Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions
自我说服：来自国际辩论比赛现场实验的证据
PeterSchwardmann; Egon Tripodi; Joël J. van derWeele
（3）
Labor Market Power
劳动力市场力量
David Berger; Kyle Herkenhoff; Simon Mongey
（4）
Measuring Geopolitical Risk
衡量地缘政治风险
Dario Caldara; MatteoIacoviellon
（5）
Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the United States
在推动投票行为方面，背景是否超过了个人特征？美国境内搬迁的证据
Enrico Cantoni; Vincent Pons
（6）
Understanding the Scarring Effectof Recessions
了解经济衰退的疤痕效应
Christopher Huckfeldt
（7）
Dynamic Price Competition, Learning-by-Doing and Strategic Buyers
动态价格竞争、边做边学和战略买家
Andrew Sweeting; Dun Jia; Shen Hui; Xinlu Yao
（8）
Wetlands, Flooding and the Clean Water Act
湿地、洪水和清洁水法
Charles A.Taylor; HannahDruckenmiller
（9）
Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences
出售消费者数据以获取利润：最佳市场细分设计及其后果
Kai Hao Yang
1
Public Procurement in Law and Practice
法律与实践中的公共采购
Erica Bosio; Simeon Djankov; Edward Glaeser; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract
We examine anew dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of theprocuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer lookshows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement inwhich both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders.
摘 要
我们研究了 187 个国家的公共采购法律、实践和结果的新数据集。我们将监管视为对采购实体自由裁量权的限制。我们发现，各国的法律和实践高度相关，更好的实践与更好的结果相关，但法律本身与结果不相关。仔细观察会发现，更严格的法律与改善结果相关，但仅限于公共部门能力较低的国家。我们提出了一种采购模型，其中监管规则和公共部门的能力决定了采购结果。在该模型中，监管在公共部门能力低的国家是有效的，但在能力高的国家则不然，因为它抑制了社会最优的自由裁量权以排除低质量投标人。
2
Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions
自我说服：来自国际辩论比赛现场实验的证据
Peter Schwardmann; Egon Tripodi; Joël J. van der Weele
Abstract
Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselve sabout the position's factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. Wetest for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debatingcompetitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argueone side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs andconfidence in one's position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase inincentives for accuracy.
实验室证据表明，当人们不得不为某个特定立场争论时，他们会说服自己相信该立场的事实和道德优越性。这种自我说服限制了沟通解决冲突和减少两极分化的潜力。我们在现场环境中测试这种现象，在国际辩论比赛中随机分配经验丰富且积极进取的辩论者来辩论主题动议的一方。我们在事实信念和对自己立场的信心中找到自我说服。效应量比实验室小，但对一小时的论据交换和对准确性的激励增加十倍是稳健的。
3
Labor Market Power
劳动力市场力量
David Berger; Kyle Herkenhoff; Simon Mongey
Abstract
We develop, estimate, andtest a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms' local labor marketshare and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes.The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labormarket power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor's share ofincome between 1977 and 2013.
摘 要
我们开发、估计和测试了一个易于处理的寡头垄断一般均衡模型，该模型具有差异化的工作和集中的劳动力市场。我们通过匹配有关公司当地劳动力市场份额与其就业和工资对州公司税变化的反应之间关系的新证据来估计关键模型参数。该模型定量地复制了关于不完美的生产率工资传递和主导雇主的战略工资设定的准实验证据。相对于有效分配，劳动力市场力量造成的福利损失为 7.6%，而产出则低 20.9%。最后，在 1977 年至 2013 年间，地方集中度的下降使劳动力在收入中的份额增加了 4 个百分点。
4
Measuring Geopolitical Risk
衡量地缘政治风险
Dario Caldara; Matteo Iacoviello
Abstract
We present a news-based measure of adverse geopolitical events and associated risks. The geopolitical risk (GPR) index spikes around the two world wars, at the beginning of theKorean War, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and after 9/11. Higher geopolitical risk foreshadows lower investment and employment and is associated with higher disaster probability and larger downside risks. The adverseconsequences of the GPR index are driven by both the threat and the realizationof adverse geopolitical events. We complement our aggregate measures with industry and firm-level indicators of geopolitical risk. Investment drops morein industries that are exposed to aggregate geopolitical risk. Higher firm-level geopolitical risk is associated with lower firm-level investment.
摘 要
我们提出了基于新闻的不利地缘政治事件和相关风险的衡量标准。地缘政治风险 (GPR) 指数在两次世界大战期间、朝鲜战争初期、古巴导弹危机期间和 9/11 之后飙升。较高的地缘政治风险预示着较低的投资和就业，并与较高的灾害概率和较大的下行风险相关。 GPR 指数的不利后果是由不利的地缘政治事件的威胁和实现所驱动的。我们用行业和公司层面的地缘政治风险指标来补充我们的综合指标。面临总体地缘政治风险的行业的投资下降幅度更大。较高的公司层面的地缘政治风险与较低的公司层面的投资相关。
5
Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the United States
在推动投票行为方面，背景是否超过了个人特征？美国境内搬迁的证据
Enrico Cantoni; Vincent Pons
Abstract
We measure the overall influence of contextual versus individual factors (e.g., voting rules and mediaas opposed to race and education) on voter behavior, and explore underlying mechanisms. Using a US-wide voter-level panel, 2008–2018, we examine voters where locate across state and county lines, tracking changes in registration,turnout, and party affiliation to estimate location and individual fixed effects in a value-added model. Location explains 37 percent of the cross-statevariation in turnout (to 63 percent for individual characteristics) and an only slightly smaller share of variation in party affiliation. Place effects are larger for young and White voters.
摘 要
我们衡量了背景与个人因素（例如，投票规则和媒体，而不是种族和教育）对选民行为的整体影响，并探索了潜在的机制。使用 2008-2018 年美国范围内的选民级别小组，我们检查跨州和县界迁移的选民，跟踪登记、投票率和党派关系的变化，以估计增值模型中的位置和个人固定效应。位置解释了 37% 的跨州投票率差异（个人特征为 63%），而党派关系的差异仅略小一些。对于年轻和白人选民来说，地方效应更大。
6
Understanding the Scarring Effect of Recessions
了解经济衰退的疤痕效应
Christopher Huckfeldt
Abstract
This paper documents that the earnings cost of job loss is concentrated among workers who find reemploymentin lower-skill occupations, and that the cost and incidence of such occupation displacement is higher for workers who lose their job during a recession. I propose a model where hiring is endogenously more selective during recessions, leading some unemployed workers to optimally search for reemployment in lower-skill jobs. The model accounts for existing estimates of the size and cyclicality of the present value cost of job loss, and the cost of entering the labor market during a recession.
摘 要
本文记录了失业的收入成本集中在那些在低技能职业中找到再就业的工人身上，而在经济衰退期间失业的工人，这种职业转移的成本和发生率更高。我提出了一个模型，在该模型中，在经济衰退期间，招聘具有内在的选择性，导致一些失业工人以最佳方式寻找低技能工作的再就业机会。该模型考虑了对失业现值成本的规模和周期性的现有估计，以及在经济衰退期间进入劳动力市场的成本。
7
Dynamic Price Competition,Learning-by-Doing, and Strategic Buyers
动态价格竞争、边做边学和战略买家
Andrew Sweeting; Dun Jia; Shen Hui; Xinlu Yao
Abstract
We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria thatexist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach maybe useful for future analyses of dynamic competition.
摘 要
我们研究了战略买方行为如何影响动态价格竞争模型中的均衡结果，在该模型中，卖方通过允许每个买方期望获得未来买方剩余的一部分而从边做边学中受益。当购买者期望获得未来剩余的一小部分份额时，当购买者只考虑他们的直接收益时存在的许多均衡被消除，并且存在的均衡是长期市场竞争更有可能保持的均衡。我们的结果与反垄断政策相关，我们的方法可能对未来的动态竞争分析有用。
8
Wetlands, Flooding, and the CleanWater Act
湿地、洪水和清洁水法
Charles A.Taylor; Hannah Druckenmiller
Abstract
In 2020 the Environmental Protection Agency narrowed the definition of "waters of the United States," significantly limiting wetland protection under the Clean Water Act. Current policy debates center on the uncertainty around wetland benefits. We estimate the value of wetlands for flood mitigation across the United States using detailed flood claims and land use data. We find the average hectare ofwetland lost between 2001 and 2016 cost society $1,840 annually, and over $8,000 in developed areas. We document significant spatial heterogeneity inwetland benefits, with implications for flood insurance policy and the 50 percent of "isolated" wetlands at risk of losing federal protection.
摘 要
2020 年，环境保护署缩小了“美国水域”的定义，显着限制了《清洁水法》对湿地的保护。当前的政策辩论集中在湿地效益的不确定性上。我们使用详细的洪水索赔和土地利用数据估计了美国湿地在减轻洪水方面的价值。我们发现 2001 年至 2016 年间平均每公顷湿地损失的社会成本为每年 1,840 美元，而发达地区则超过 8,000 美元。我们记录了湿地效益的显着空间异质性，对洪水保险政策和 50% 的“孤立”湿地有失去联邦保护的风险产生影响。
9
Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences
出售消费者数据以获取利润：最佳市场细分设计及其后果
Kai Hao Yang
Abstract
A data broker sells market segmentations to a producer with private cost who sells a product to a unitmass of consumers. This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanisms for the data broker. Every optimal mechanism induces quasi-perfect price discrimination.All the consumers with values above a cost-dependent cutoff buy by paying theirvalues while the rest of consumers do not buy. The characterization implies that market outcomes remain unchanged even if the data broker becomes morepowerful—either by gaining the ability to sell access to consumers or bybecoming a retailer who purchases the product and sells to the consumers exclusively.
摘 要
数据经纪人将市场细分出售给具有私人成本的生产者，后者将产品出售给单位质量的消费者。本文描述了数据代理的收入最大化机制。每一个最优机制都会引发准完美的价格歧视。所有价值高于与成本相关的临界值的消费者通过支付他们的价值购买，而其余消费者不购买。该特征意味着即使数据经纪人变得更强大，市场结果仍然保持不变——无论是通过获得向消费者销售访问权的能力，还是通过成为购买产品并专门向消费者销售的零售商。
编辑：孙杜霞
审核：李文清
资料来源于期刊网址，仅供学术交流使用，不得用于商业用途！来源：
https://www.aeaweb.org/issues/673
往期回顾：
#期刊目录
#前沿佳文
前沿佳文·华南城市群生态系统人为干扰强度及其驱动因素量化研究(总第107期)
#学术讲座
#招聘信息
中国科学院空天信息创新研究院城市陆表环境遥感研究团队博士后招聘启事
师资博后|首都经济贸易大学城市群决策模拟北京市重点实验室招聘师资博士后
“致力于学术分享与学术传播，助推学术中国梦！”
关注发公众号，追踪最新研究成果
Bilibili账号更新教学课程、经验分享、学术会议
Bilibili账号
bili_8462582243